Persian Gulf | Red Sea
This text was originally written by the coordinator of the respective volume for the print edition as an introduction to the geographic area in question; the possibility of updating it was left to each author’s discretion. It should be interpreted together with the general introductory text from the respective volume.
The Portuguese presence and heritage of Portuguese origin in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea
Domingos Luís de Oliveira, a sailor and galleon captain with a great deal of Indian Ocean experience, once wrote a letter to the king apprising him of the overall situation in the region and steps to take to improve the Portuguese crown’s position. The missive’s date has not been determined, though it was certainly before Christmas 1693. His diagnosis of the major problems and threats the Portuguese faced is interesting: “it is true that the alleviation of that condition and the current trade limitations and the poverty of voyages is due to the European nations, the British, Dutch and French, sailing east with such abundant merchandise” (Iria, 1973, p. 287). In sum, in the Orient, besides the dangers and conflicts with regional powers, Portugal suffered from competition from other European nations and had no ability to respond. And while this state of affairs was true for the Indian Ocean in general, it was all the more so in the Persian Gulf, Oman and Red Sea region, as Domingos Luís de Oliveira asserted. Moreover, it was widely acknowledged that the situation had worsened since the loss of Hormuz first and then of Muscat. It is also important to recall that the Persian Gulf was actually one of the areas which structured the Portuguese presence in the region and that Hormuz was at its centre.
In an article published in 2008, Svat Soucek pointed out two distinct periods to characterise the Portuguese presence in the Persian Gulf and Oman. The first dates from the Portuguese arrival in the region in 1507, when led by Afonso de Albuquerque they began frequenting Gulf ports and tried to capture Hormuz, finally succeeding in 1515. This period lasted until 1616, the year the English arrived. A short period of competition followed, ending in 1622 when the Portuguese garrison of Hormuz surrendered. The English, or rather, the ships of the East India Company, played a decisive role in this event; indeed, all opinions agree that without English naval support the Persians would have never been able to recover Hormuz. It is also surprising that Portugal was defeated in the Orient by an alliance formed by Christians, at a time when the English King James I (1603-1625) was doing everything possible to please his Spanish ally, who was also king of Portugal (Filipe III). How was this possible? The answer obliges us to take into account a broader context encompassing the Portuguese arrival in the region and the consolidation of their presence as well as their departure, as all those events are closely connected to the political context and strategic interests focused on the Persian Gulf. Various major powers had practically since the 16th century maintained more or less direct interests in this region of the Indian Ocean. The farthest was the Chinese Empire of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), which generally had good relations with the Portuguese. Then there were the Persians under the Safavid dynasty, the Islamic Mughal kingdom and the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagara in the heart of the Indian subcontinent. A fifth power was the Ottomans, well known to the Europeans and the Portuguese crown. In their settlement strategy the Portuguese also had to deal with smaller yet no less significant kingdoms, sultanates and cities; though carrying less political weight and with more limited strategic interests, they were nevertheless quite ready to dispute the profits of the maritime trade which had always provided a portion of their revenue.
We begin with the Safavids (1501-1736) of the Persian Empire, whose relations with Portugal alternated between peace and war. Although they lost Hormuz, a state over which they were sovereign, they never considered the loss definitive. But from at least 1510 on they needed the Portuguese as allies to defend themselves against the Sunni Turks, a threat which increased when the Ottomans defeated the Egyptian Mamluks in 1517. This shift of attitudes lasted for quite some time. At the end of the 16th century the reign of Shah Abbas (1587-1629) was again marked by changing relations with the Christians and namely with the Portuguese. Pressing threats to the empire’s security first led the shah to move the capital to Esfahan (1598), a city less exposed to attacks. The need for allies and good communication channels then led him to promote a policy of more openness to the Armenian Christians and even to Portuguese religious missions. On the other hand, the alleviation of threats and the security provided by new alliances with the English meant the same shah could move forward with efforts to retake Hormuz. Yet he did not intend a total break with the shifting alliances, so when Hormuz was captured he proposed that the Portuguese accept the Fortress of Keshm as an alternative, an offer known to have been rejected. So while calculations for the reasons to reject a Portuguese presence also took into account the expected trade promised by the new English and Dutch allies, it is certain that the proposals kept other alternatives open.
The situation with the powerful Mughal kingdom was more unstable. During the 16th century, this kingdom viewed Ottoman expansion with some apprehension, hence, the easing of relations with Portugal is not surprising. Furthermore, in the scope of political ties between Muslim and Christian kingdoms, the long-lasting rule of Akbar (1556-1605) significantly facilitated the Portuguese presence. Beyond the external threats, this ruler promoted a policy of far-reaching religious tolerance that included accepting the arrival and settlement of Portuguese and Italian missions, specifically of Jesuits, indicating a certain intellectual curiosity about other religions and outlooks on the world. The Portuguese thus always sought to maintain trade with this powerful kingdom in the Indian interior.
Lastly, we focus on Portugal’s most feared opponent in the region: the Ottomans. After conquering Egypt in 1517, the latter seemed to indicate that they would shift the merciless conflict then waged in the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. This aim became clearer soon afterwards when they captured Basrah with a view to making its port a naval base oriented against Portuguese interests and specifically the city of Hormuz. It is not always easy to understand Ottoman strategy in the Indian Ocean, as after the efforts to capture Basrah their most important attempts against the Portuguese were carried out from Suez. Some of those episodes were especially difficult for the Portuguese crown. In 1552 an expedition undertaken by the famous Ottoman Piri Reis (Hali Ahmed Muhiddin Piri) created serious problems in the Gulf; that year he was able to expel the Portuguese from Muscat. A similar outcome occurred with the 1581 expedition led by Mir Ali Bey, who was able to approach the Turks from the remote sultanate of Aceh, while maintaining some trade channels open to the Portuguese. With few exceptions, Ottoman power in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Persian Gulf, was otherwise mostly land-based, supported by several outposts never given sufficient conditions to compete in the region. Finally, the major naval defeat inflicted by the Portuguese in 1559 established Portugal’s naval supremacy at sea. The Ottoman attitude must be connected to how they perceived the Portuguese threat. Indeed, early 16th century Arab chroniclers often reported on the dangers of the Portuguese presence in the Red Sea and what that presence meant for the Mamluks. The Arab historian Ibn Iyas, for example, explains how the threat of the Portuguese fleet led to a halt in trade between India and the Middle East in 1507, severely harming the interests of Cairo.
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that, in the end, the true competitors of the Portuguese were Christians who helped local powers expel them from the Persian Gulf and Oman. The lead players in this story, somewhat strange for the epoch, were as we know the English trading companies (the aforementioned East India Company and Courteen’s Association) and those from the United Provinces of the Netherlands (the Vereenigde Oost- -Indische Compagnie – United East India Company – usually abbreviated to VOC). From the start we must mention that these newcomers gradually became familiar with the region, gaining knowledge that was neither vague nor based on second-hand information. The published maps are an indication of the thorough surveying and reconnaissance work undertaken. Whereas at the start the two English companies still competed to control markets and influences, the first soon became totally dominant. The East India Company was established in London in 1600, reached the Gulf in 1616 and was soon in direct contact with the shah of Persia. Their modus operandi did not instil much fear among the local powers, as it was based on a model which at the time did not involve the construction of any sort of fortified system, depending rather on business channelled through commercial houses – the trading posts – for which they received permission to operate. They also took advantage of some bad choices made by the Portuguese crown to specifically get closer to the Persians. Indeed, after Filipe II rejected their trade proposal regarding silk, the English were able to establish a firm foothold in Persia through the shah. This enabled the 1618 contract to be signed, which included concession of the port of Jask, near Hormuz.
It is thus not surprising that the English supported the Persians against the Portuguese in the attack on Hormuz. What is known is indeed rather enlightening. At first, most of the company directors wanted to reject the Persian shah’s proposal. Edward Monnox then intervened, clearly explaining the potential options: if the East India Company wanted to plant roots in the region, if it intended to have consistent business dealings, if it aimed to ensure long-term operations in the Orient, then there was no other choice and it would be important to help the Persians against the Portuguese, even though the latter were Christians and the English king, in Europe, sought to maintain friendly relations with his Spanish counterpart. After all, although it was certain that the conflict had heretofore taken place at sea, the major purpose driving English interests was to replace the Portuguese as trade intermediaries, especially for silk. Hence most council members soon shifted to favouring aid to the Persians, though the East India Company directors later disclaimed responsibility. We must recognize the historical validity of these arguments: many centuries have passed and the English and English companies still maintain solid ties to the region. Despite this episode, only in 1635 was the establishment of English companies given a decisive boost by the truce in Europe and the opening of Portuguese ports in the region, promoted by the Count of Linhares.
The Dutch and the VOC also ravaged the region, though their presence in the Gulf was much less noted. But the overall negative effects were felt everywhere: not only because they participated in the fleet resulting from the 1609 treaty, but also because during the Iberian Union period they took every opportunity to attack Portuguese interests in the Indian Ocean, building fortresses at several locations, though above all and based on the law of nature they openly defended free navigation and maritime trade, thereby jeopardising the Portuguese monopoly.
In the confrontation between old and new rivals the qualities and the tireless efforts of some Portuguese military leaders, notably including Rui Freire de Andrade, were insufficient. He fought the English and Muslims until his death in 1633, attempting to keep trade routes open, safeguarding the strait and thus national interests. But this effort was in vain, because the relationship of combined forces in the Strait was unfavourable to the Portuguese. Again, the comments by Domingos Luís de Oliveira concerning the reasons for Portuguese weakness in the Strait state that: “exhausted [....] the revenues from the custom houses, and the straits of the Red Sea, Arabia and Persia, where we controlled Muscat, Hormuz and other kingdoms [...] our ships do not collect the merchandise which they produce, because they cannot navigate in those seas without a garrison” (Iria, 1973, p. 288). As mentioned above, Hormuz played a central role in the strategy governing Portugal’s Indian Ocean presence, acting as the first hub for activities in the Persian Gulf and Oman. Hormuz was actually the keystone of the military and commercial framework set up in the Persian Gulf, a role that would be played by Muscat after the former was lost in 1622. And after the wealthy Omani city of Muscat fell in 1650, the Portuguese presence in the region lost its coherence.
Returning to Hormuz, it is easy to justify why this city was coveted by all, for much of the region’s trade was channelled through its port. Despite its inherent supply problems, especially regarding water, this city was not just a political power centre, it was also a place where trade networks converged. It supplied many of the caravans that provisioned major cities in Persia and assured the transportation of horses to Muslim and Hindu potentates in India. Its custom house levied taxes on salt, pearls, dry fruit and nuts, Armenian wine from Shiraz, silks and brocades from Aleppo and Damascus. The important silver larin coinage naturally circulated here, therefore making the custom house a substantial source of revenue. According to calculations, all figures indicate a city through which a significant amount of the region’s trade passed. Subrahmanyam, in his work analysing the Portuguese Asian empire from the early 16th century to the late 17th century, presents a table of Hormuz customs revenues in the 1540s which is very indicative of this port’s importance to Portuguese trade in the Orient. In those ten years the revenue considered normal from trade with the Gujarat region varied between the considerable amount of 35,000 and 45,000 gold xerafins. Trade with Persia varied between 35,000 and 40,000. Even though Basrah and Sindh were less important, they brought in from 8,000 to 10,000 xerafins, while duties paid by Portuguese wavered between 10,000 and 13,000 xerafins. Royal income from the same port in turn reached a high point in 1541, with the entrance of 111,779 xerafins, while the lowest amount was collected in 1548 – only 61,646 xerafins. Given that each xerafin, a Persian coin with a high concentration of precious metal, then weighed around 2.56 or 2.57 grams, we can imagine the importance of the financial resources generated by Hormuz. A quick analysis of these figures enables us to perceive the huge amounts obtained from trade through Hormuz in the mid-sixteenth century, though in this significant case they also indicate the port’s connection with the region’s major trade routes and networks: northwest India, i.e. Gujarat and Sindh, the latter in present day Pakistan, as well as the Persian Gulf, and connections to the port of Basrah and especially Persia, thus enabling multiple eastward and westward connections. When Hormuz was lost, Portugal’s central position in the Gulf disappeared; this loss was even more deeply felt because the Portuguese had enjoyed a sort of legitimate title, since the kings of Hormuz had accepted Portuguese sovereignty. It was not just the change of political background, the emergence of new rivals and the probable Portuguese unpreparedness or inability to counter the situation that accounts for the major losses Portugal suffered in the Persian Gulf and Oman. Indeed, it must again be underscored that Portuguese power was centred on a number of places which, once lost, diminished the coherence of the whole. A glance at maps of Portugal’s presence in the Gulf, comparing them to the timeline of losses Portugal suffered in the 17th century, enables us easily to understand this situation.
A quick analysis of these figuresConsider the case of the Portuguese fortresses in modern day Bahrain. While the Fortress of Qal’at al Bahrain was a significant trading post, the one at Qal’at Abu Mahir was basically used to protect ships travelling to the former. The so-called Arab Fort (Qal’at al Arad) was built later, apparently to ensure the connection of the other two fortresses. Other forts served and protected Muscat’s trade and connections, among them Kalba, Al Bidyah, Qurayat and Mutrah. Keshm, Qalhat and Ras al-Khaimah pertained to the group of forts the Portuguese built to support the city and trade to and from Hormuz. Other locations were seized to protect navigation in the Strait, among them Dibba, Limah, Khasab and Khawr Fakkan. Tarut, for example, was meant to support the Portuguese presence and interests in Basrah. One must not surmise, however, that the forces were organised with any sort of consolidated strategic reasoning and planning. Some of the occupations and fortress construction efforts resulted from special situations and even sudden decisions, leading to their early abandonment when the limits of their use became obvious. A good example of such a situation is that of Madha, whose takeover was ordered by Rui Freire de Andrade in 1624, on the pretext that it was the starting point for various attacks against the Portuguese.
The successive entries in this inventory show that, besides the fortified structures, there are also indications of a surprising Portuguese religious heritage in the region. This is obviously connected to the presence of the priests, orders and missions which circulated and in some cases settled in the region of Oman and the Persian Gulf. It is not hard to understand the paramount role these religious institutions played in the consolidation of Portuguese interests; besides religious proselytising, they created channels of communication with the various regional powers and were a major source of information of all kinds, serving as ambassadors and often playing a key role in mediating conflicts. In some regions such as Persia, even after the Portuguese left they kept missions near churches and monasteries which continued to function. While we do know where they settled, we have less or basically no information about the heritage they left behind in the Persian Gulf and Oman, and which extended northward to Georgia. Indeed, Gori in Georgia and Esfahan and Shiraz in Persia were cities that counted their own Augustinian convents, although their precise location is currently unknown. Even Basrah had a convent of that order next to the Portuguese military position. The Jesuits in turn benefitted from the Persian need to defend against the Sunni Turks and had established themselves in Hormuz even before its definitive occupation by Afonso de Albuquerque in 1515. The Mughal emperor Akbar I (1558-1605) welcomed missions from the Society of Jesus, which only suffered occasional harm when orthodoxy increased in the court of the of Grand Mughal. In any case, these missions played a key role in counterbalancing English influence, which began to be felt throughout the region from the second decade of the 17th century on. The first embassy took place from 1580 to 1583 and comprised three priests from the society, among them Francisco Henriques. The second was in 1590 and the third, with the most impact, followed in 1595; indeed, its effects lasted as late as the early 19th century. It is associated to the famous figures of Jerónimo Xavier, Manuel Pinheiro and Bento de Góis; men such as the latter became an inexhaustible source of information and knowledge for Portugal. Bento de Góis, initially from 1584 to 1588 and then from 1602 to 1607, when he died in Suzhou, China, stopped at many locations on the so-called Silk Route, crossing Persia, Arabia, Baluchistan and the Gobi Desert before travelling across China and throughout Asia. During this period, he was able to maintain communications with India and thus help the Portuguese obtain better knowledge about the East, its people, languages and markets.
Here a brief assessment of the kind of fortified structures the Portuguese built in the region is necessary. Note that, despite the consistent praise from chroniclers, it seems certain that most such construction projects in the Gulf, with few exceptions, were built gradually. This aspect is important for understanding the blend of building styles, materials and solutions. For this reason, in the East some projects were overseen by governors, when not by the master masons themselves. A recent paper based on a university thesis sought to assess the kind of fortified structures the Portuguese built in the Gulf. It examines 17 fortresses from the Manueline period; some of the conclusions are very enlightening. The first is well-known and concerns the fortresses’ location, which emphasises the coastal profile of the Portuguese presence. Fortresses were preferably situated on islands, at the mouths of rivers, on peninsulas, headlands or river fords, always facing the sea. Alternatively, when required by topographic conditions, some were located on promontories. An interesting aspect of this analysis is that it showed how rare it was for old fortresses to be reused: only three of the 17 surveyed, including the Suqutrah Fortress. This seems to indicate not only a lack of confidence regarding the materials used and the structure’s solidity on the site, for the Portuguese used stone and lime in construction, but also highlights the fact that their presence involved the establishment of a new sort of military position, or at least one based on military principles not previously experienced or otherwise rare in the Orient. Most fortresses belong to the so-called transition style, which implied reduced precincts and thus smaller defence garrisons. The new tendencies for less reinforcement of the bases and increased wall thickness are also perceptible. The respective forms followed two known models: the square coastal fort, as at Elmina, and the maritime tower with its improved artillery arrangements. Although little studied, many of these structures are still visible at sites around the Persian Gulf and along the Omani coast. Some, such as the ones in Bahrain and Muscat, have been rebuilt and restored; for their heritage value they are also included in the list of assets and structures that UNESCO deems part of the World Heritage.
A final word should be said to justify the title given to this section of the inventory, which includes such diverse places as Gori in present day Georgia and Suqutrah at the entrance to the Red Sea. Within the aforementioned political context, this region of the Indian Ocean is associated to confrontation with the Turks and the Arab world in general. This was a region where the Portuguese, besides establishing a trading post, could only remain if they built well-fortified spaces. Yet the efforts were worthwhile, despite the dangers: a large portion of the riches that met contemporary European consumer desires was drawn from the region. That is why 16th century sailors produced beautiful route maps which often used terms such as ‘Persian Gulf’ and ‘Mar Roxo’ (Purple Sea) with their current meanings as Red Sea. And that is why those terms are used now to designate the strategic realities so carefully and thoroughly described by Portuguese pilots at that time.